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Abstract: This study aims to examine the effect of the effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners, directors, audit committees and external audit (audit costs, the size of 
the Public Accounting Firm and the audit opinion) on the level of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. The study uses a sample of 142 non-financial public companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2011 and 2012. The result of the study 
concludes that the size of the public accounting firm has a significant negative effect 
on the level of mandatory disclosure, while the effectiveness of the board of 
commissioners and directors positively influence mandatory disclosure. The 
effectiveness of the directors and audit committee also positively influence the level of 
voluntary disclosure, whereas external audit does not influence the level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
Keywords: Effectiveness, Mandatory Disclosure, Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh efektivitas dewan 
komisaris, direksi, komite audit dan audit eksternal (biaya audit, ukuran Kantor 
Akuntan Publik dan opini audit) pada tingkat pengungkapan wajib dan sukarela. 
Penelitian ini menggunakan sampel dari 142 perusahaan publik non-keuangan yang 
terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 2011 dan 2012. Hasil penelitian 
menyimpulkan bahwa ukuran kantor akuntan publik memiliki pengaruh negatif yang 
signifikan terhadap tingkat pengungkapan wajib, sementara efektivitas dewan 
komisaris dan direksi berpengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan wajib. Efektivitas 
direksi dan komite audit juga secara positif mempengaruhi tingkat pengungkapan 
sukarela, sedangkan audit eksternal tidak mempengaruhi tingkat pengungkapan 
sukarela. 
 
Kata Kunci: Efektivitas, Pengungkapan Wajib, Pengungkapan Sukarela 
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1. Introduction 
Each company consists of several components, namely the General Meeting of 
Shareholders as of the highest component, the Board of Directors who manages the 
company and the Board of Commissioners who supervises the directors. The 
difference of interests between capital owners and management in managing the 
company causes the agency problem. Agency theory that links the differences in 
ownership and control provides the theoretical basis for research of corporate 
governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory states that incentives related to 
performance can mitigate agency costs, as well as the interests of the managers in line 
with the increase of shareholder value. Disclosure of information is a prerequisite for 
managers to monitor and analyze performance (Gao & Kling, 2012). 
Indonesia implements the two-tier system which separates the board of 
commissioners and board of directors. This system is also implemented in China as 
described by Gao & Kling (2012). The board of commissioners or supervisory board 
must oversee the board of directors and senior management, in which the members are 
independent. The Board of Directors is a collegial organ of a company that manages 
the company (KNKG, 2006). The directors are also responsible for reporting the 
company's performance information to the owner of the company. The audit 
committee is a committee responsible for assisting the board of commissioners in 
overseeing management's performance specifically within the scope of the report 
preparation related to audit activities of the company. The effectiveness of the board 
of commissioners, board of directors and the audit committee can be measured 
through the aspects of the activity and independence that positively impact the 
company's performance through the implementation of Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG), including in terms of increasing the disclosure of the given information (Fang 
et al., 2009). 
The company's annual report as a means of disclosure could have implications for 
investor decision making. Disclosure of annual report is governed by the disclosure 
guidelines issued by Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan 
(Bapepam-LK) through regulation No. X.K.6 about Submission of Annual Report of 
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Public Company. The annual report may contain other information beyond that are 
required, referred as voluntary disclosure items. Henry & Palepu (2001) states that 
voluntary disclosure is the disclosure of more information based on the initiative of 
the management. One of the points in the annual report which is required to be 
disclosed as well as the most widely used are the audited financial statements. The 
financial statement audit process shall be conducted by independent parties such as 
Public Accounting Firms. 
For each audit services, the public accounting firm will receive audit fees 
following the provisions such as the experiences of the auditor and also the required 
time and complexity of the audit. After the standardized audit procedure is performed, 
the public accounting firm will issue an audit report containing an independent 
opinion on the financial statements. An audit opinion other than the unqualified can be 
a sign of the company's performance (Gao & Kling, 2012). The audit cost depends on 
the selection of auditors. The Big Four accounting firms that have better reputation 
tend to charge higher audit cost. This study assesses the broader impact of external 
audit activity against the disclosure of the company's annual report since both the 
financial statements and the annual report are clear evidence of the transparency of 
information provided by the company. Also, the annual report also reveals the audit 
cost and audited financial reports of the companies. 
In contrast with the study by Gao & Kling (2012) in China, this study assesses the 
effectiveness of the board of commissioners, directors and audit committee as a 
supporting committee of the board of commissioners by using an effectiveness 
assessment checklist developed by Hermawan (2009). The assessment result can be 
categorized as poor, fair, or good according to the applicable assessment criteria. The 
poor, fair, or good rating reflects the effectiveness of the board of commissioner, 
directors and audit committees of public companies. This effectiveness checklist 
provides an advantage for this research by combining several categories of the 
effectiveness assessment of the board, such as the size of the board,  and activities that 
tend to be examined separately in previous studies.  
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Based on the explanation above, the problem formulation of this research are as 
follows: 
1. What is the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure level in public 
companies? 
2. What is the extent of effectiveness of the board of commissioner, directors and 
audit committees level in public companies? 
3. Does the effectiveness of the board of commissioners, directors, audit 
committees and external audit have a positive effect on the level of mandatory 
disclosure of the annual report?  
4. Does the effectiveness of the board of commissioners, directors, audit 
committees and external audit have a positive effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure of the annual report? 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
Studies conducted by Shen et al. (2010), Zhang and Huang (2010) and Fang et al. 
(2009) as cited in Sun et al. (2012), shows that BOC or more specifically the 
independent commissioners, positively influence voluntary disclosure in some aspects 
such as corporate social responsibility and internal controls. In Indonesia, the 
disclosure of corporate social responsibility and internal controls have become 
mandatory. Fama (1980) and Fama & Jansen (1983) as cited by Eng and Mak (2003) 
states that the more independent directors in a company, the better monitoring quality 
towards the directors. This will also limit the opportunities for management to gain 
benefits. Independent commissioner will also tend to encourage companies to disclose 
better information to investors. 
 
H1a. The effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners positively influence the 
mandatory disclosure of the company's annual report 
H1b. The effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners positively influences voluntary 
disclosure of the company's annual reports. 
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Directors have the responsibility to prepare and understand the overall 
components of the annual report including the decision to disclose and not to disclose 
certain points. Disclosures can also be viewed as a way to signal the expected 
performance to be achieved. The more transparent the disclosures either through 
mandatory or voluntary disclosure items will give the stakeholders a clearer 
understanding of the management’s action and performance (Franco et al., 2013). 
Disclosure as a way of assessing the performance of directors was also examined by 
Hermalin (1993) in Franco et al. (2013) who found that the more transparent 
information disclosure will imply that the directors have an effective role and good 
performance. Therefore, directors are likely to reveal information in a more 
transparent way, both mandatory and voluntary disclosure items, so that their 
performance can be known. This research uses an effectiveness checklist developed 
from the BOC effectiveness checklist by Herman (2009), which contains activity, 
number of members and competency aspects as proxies for the effectiveness of the 
board of directors. 
 
H2a.   The effectiveness of the Board of Directors positively influence the mandatory 
disclosure of the company's annual report 
H2b.   The effectiveness of the Board of Directors positively influences voluntary 
disclosure of a company's annual reports. 
 
Dechow et al. (1996) and McMullen (1996) examined the positive influence of the 
audit committee on the quality of financial statements disclosure which is one of the 
mandatory disclosure items in annual reports. Companies with fraudulent financial 
statements are likely not to have a reliable audit committee. Li, Mangena, and Pike 
(2012) examined the effect of audit committee effectiveness that is measured from the 
meeting’s activity and the number of audit committee members, on the disclosure of 
the intellectual capital that can be measured using multiple categories, such as the 
human capital, relational capital and structural capital. The measurement items of 
human capital include the age distribution of employees, employee training and race 
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distribution of employees. Relational capital is measured by the level of customer 
satisfaction, customer appreciation, market penetration, and marketing. 
Meanwhile, structural capital is measured by distribution network, technology, 
and research and development. The capitalization of research and development costs, 
the age of employees and marketing are the mandatory disclosure items in the annual 
report. Meanwhile, the distribution network, market penetration and customer 
satisfaction are the voluntary disclosure items of annual reports used in this study. The 
results showed a significant positive influence of the meeting’s activity and the 
number of audit committee members on the disclosure of the intellectual capital. 
 
H3a. Audit Committee Effectiveness positively influence mandatory disclosure of the 
company's annual report 
H3b. Audit Committee Effectiveness positively influence voluntary disclosure of the 
company's annual reports. 
 
The increasing size of companies generally causes high audit cost, thus increasing 
the extensiveness of disclosure level that also increases the audit complexity (Simunic, 
1980; Beattie et al., 2001). In other words, the high audit cost occurs because the large 
companies disclose more information, both mandatory of voluntary information which 
makes the auditing process more complicated. Simunic (1980) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1983) found that audit cost would increase along with the increase of 
auditor's effort in auditing information. Ball et al. (2012) states that audit costs are 
directly related to the quantity and price of audit activity that is related to the 
independent verification of financial statements. In practice, audit cost covered by the 
companies only relate to financial statements audit. Nonetheless, the numbers in the 
financial statements also compile some mandatory information contained in the annual 
report. Thus the audit of financial statements will indirectly affect the disclosure of 
other information in the annual report. 
  On the other hand, the annual report also contains private information that tends 
to be more expensive and risky when audited. Nonetheless, the audit of financial 
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statements can increase management's credibility and transparency in disclosing 
private information (Ball et al., 2012). Thus, we can conclude that an external audit 
activity has a positive influence on the mandatory disclosure of the annual report that 
contains the financial statements and on the voluntary disclosure of which contains 
private information. Similarly, the cost of the audit positively influences the 
company's annual report disclosure of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure.  
 
H4a. The cost of external audit positively influence mandatory disclosure of the 
company's annual report 
H4b. The cost of external audit positively influences voluntary disclosure of the 
company's annual reports. 
 
Wang, Wong & Xiac (2008) states that companies tend to engage a large 
accounting firm to conduct an audit because they are considered to be more competent 
and experienced so that it can provide better quality. Economic benefits obtained 
through the external audit activity which relates to independency as studied by 
DeAngelo (1981) is the auditor's ability to find errors or irregularities in the 
accounting system and not influence by the client's pressure to limit the disclosure of 
errors or irregularities. Moreover, DeAngelo (1981) states that the larger firm which is 
measured by the number of clients will tend not to act opportunistically and have a 
better audit quality. Thus, the Big Four accounting firm can increase the mandatory 
disclosure of the annual report. This is also supported by Wang and Chen (2004) 
which states that Chinese companies which are audited by a Big Five accounting firm 
(at that time still the Big Five), tend to have better transparency of accounting 
information disclosure than those which are not audited by the Big Five. Chau & Grey 
(2010) states that companies audited by the Big Four accounting firm tend to have a 
better level of disclosure because the accounting firms are likely to encourage the 
clients' companies to disclose more information. Ball et al. (2012) also found the 
notion that a company whose financial statement is audited by the Big Four 
accounting firm, signify that the management has made more effort to disclose 
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information more often which includes the voluntary estimation and signals better 
voluntarily disclosure. 
 
H5a. Companies whose financial statements are audited by a Big Four accounting 
firm have a higher level of annual report mandatory disclosure than those 
whose financial statements are audited by non-Big Four accounting firm. 
H5B. Companies whose financial statements are audited by a Big Four accounting 
firm have a higher level of annual report voluntary disclosure than those 
whose financial statements are audited by non-Big Four accounting firm. 
 
When auditor decides to give other than unqualified opinion, it indicates 
negligence in the delivery of accounting information and indicates asymmetry 
information between the company and stakeholders (Lin, Jiang, and Xi; 2012). Ball et 
al. (2012) describe the information of financial statements considered as credible but 
less informative because it is mandatory, whereas information on the voluntary 
forecast is considered less credible, but very informative. Information on the voluntary 
forecast which includes information such as projected sales and market share in the 
future become one of the voluntary disclosure points examined in this study. Investors 
tend to assume what the audit opinions, can reflect the quality of voluntary disclosure. 
Thus, it can be concluded that unqualified opinion positively influences the level of 
voluntary disclosure of the annual report. Gao Research & Kling (2012) found that 
audit opinion other than unqualified opinion positively influence the lower level of 
disclosure, so in other words, the unqualified audit opinion would increase the 
disclosure of the annual report. Nevertheless, the study by Lin, Jiang, and Xi (2011) 
towards companies with an opinion other than unqualified opinion indicate audit 
opinion does not always have a negative effect on the firm's value.  
 
H6a. Companies that obtain an unqualified audit opinion have a higher level of 
annual report mandatory disclosure than the company that obtains other than 
unqualified audit opinion. 
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H6b. Companies that obtain an unqualified audit opinion have a higher level of 
annual report voluntary disclosure of the company that obtains other than an 
unqualified audit opinion. 
 
3. Research Methods 
The sample that is used in this study are the companies that are listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange from the year 2011-2012, except companies that are in the financial 
industry, due to the nature as a highly-regulated industry. This study used a sample of 
companies that publish the full annual report and the data in it such as financial 
reports, audit fees, audit opinion and the firm conducting the audit. 
This research uses data from two different years,  data from the year 2012 for the 
dependent variable and 2011 for the independent variable, based on the premise that 
the disclosure practices of companies does not change instantly in one term, but 
instead rely on the previous corporate governance and external audits practices which 
impact the disclosures in the current year. The tendency not to assess the impact of the 
current disclosure practice which is based on the condition of the company and related 
practices in the previous period can make the research result bias (Gao & Kling, 
2012). 
 
Research Model 1: 
MDISCit = α0 + α1 BSUPSit-1 + α2  BDIRSCit-1 + α3 ACOMMit-1 + α4 AFEEit-1 + α5 
AFIRMit-1 + α6 AOPINit-1 + α7 SIZEit-1 + α8 LEVit-1 + α9 EVEBITit-1 + α10 ROAit-1 + it 
 
Reaearch Model 2: 
VDISCit =  α0 + α1 BSUPSit-1 + α2  BDIRSCit-1 + α3 ACOMMit-1 + α4 AFEEit-1 + α5 
AFIRMit-1 + α6 AOPINit-1 + α7 SIZEit-1 + α8 LEVit-1 + α9 EVEBITit-1 + α10 ROAit-1 + it  
Information: 
Dependent Variables: 
MDISC = the level of mandatory disclosure of an annual report 
VDISC = the level of voluntary disclosure of an annual report 
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Independent Variables: 
BSUPS = the level of the effectiveness of the board of commissioners 
BDIRSC = the level of the effectiveness of the board of directors 
ACOMM = the level of effectiveness of the audit committee 
AFEE = audit fees issuers logarithm 
Afirm = accounting firm dummy variable; 1 =  Big Four, 0 = non Big Four 
AOPIN = audit opinion on the financial statements dummy variable; 1 for unqualified 
opinion, 0 to opinions other than unqualified 
 
Control variables: 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV = leverage (total debt divided by total equity) 
EVEBIT = the enterprise value divided by Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) 
ROA = net profit before exceptional items divided by total assets 
 
4. Results  
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the research. The MDISC variable 
that describes the level of the mandatory disclosure has a quite high mean of  79.67%. 
The VDISC variable that describes the level of voluntary disclosure has an average 
that is quite low at 32.8%. The effectiveness of the board of commissioners is at the 
level of 71%, or the good criteria tend to be fair as well as the effectiveness of the 
audit committee at the level of 73%. The effectiveness of directors is at the level of 
80% or in good criteria. Among the companies in the sample,  61% has been audited 
by non-Big Four accounting firm, and only 1% has not received an unqualified 
opinion. The companies surveyed evenly have a debt level of 50% of the equity and 
profitable business characterized by average positive ROA. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics Result 
 
 
Based on table 2, the average value of the level of mandatory disclosure of the 
issuer's annual report is 79.68% or 128 items from a total 161 points which must be 
disclosed. This indicates the level of mandatory disclosure of annual reports in 
Indonesia is at a good rate though it is still not high enough. The category that has the 
highest level of the disclosure generally summarise the annual report and audited 
financial statements that have been assessed and results in an average value that is 
close to the total item's score that can be disclosed. This indicates that almost all the 
company disclose a general overview of the annual report and audited financial 
statements in its annual report. Based on Table 3, the average value of voluntary 
disclosure in the 2012 annual report is quite low with an average value of 19.39 or 
when translated in the disclosure index will generate a rate of 33%. A lack of 
disclosure incentives can cause this so that companies tend not to disclose more or 
tend only to disclose the required points. 
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Table 2.  
Descriptive Statistics of The Mandatory Disclosure Level 
 
Category Number of 
Questions 
Mean Max Min Standard 
Deviation 
Disclosure 
Average (%) 
General 
Description 
12 11.894
4 
12 11 0.3085 99% 
Financial Data 
Overview 
27 19.126
8 
24 10 2.2843 71% 
The Board of 
Commissioner 
Report 
3 2.1620 3 1 0.4710 72% 
The Board of 
Directors Report 
4 2.8662 4 1 0.7647 72% 
Company Profile 26 20.126
8 
27 11 2.8079 77% 
Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis 
27 15.774
6 
25 5 4.7660 58% 
Corporate 
Governance 
52 25.774
6 
52 5 11.0572 50% 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
5 3.7394 5 0 1.7369 75% 
Audited Financial 
Statements 
1 0.9718 1 0 0.1660 97% 
Signature of 
Commissioners 
and Directors 
4 1.9789 2 0 0.1871 49% 
Total Score 161 128.28
4 
155 44 24.5496 79.
% 
 
 
Table 4 shows that the average value of BoC effectiveness is at fair levels 
which are shown by the total value of 35.64 or 2.10 (divided by the total question). 
This implies that there is inequality because there is a company which has a total value 
of 45 indicates that the BoC had been effective and a company whose total value is 21 
indicates the BOC of the company had not been effective. 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive Statistics of The Voluntary Disclosure Level 
 
Category  Number of 
Questions 
Mean Max Min Standard 
Deviation 
Disclosure 
Average (%) 
Background 
Information 
14 5.3803 13 0 2.3269 38% 
Summary of 
Historical Result 
3 1.7958 3 0 1.0622 60% 
Non-Key 
Statistics 
Financial 
20 3.9296 10 0 2.4017 20% 
Projection 
Information 
8 3.6972 8 0 1.8218 46% 
Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis 
5 2.3521 4 0 0.9007 47% 
Human 
Resource 
6 1.7887 6 0 1.9272 30% 
Marketing 3 0.4507 3 0 0.7493 15% 
Total Score 59 19.394
4 
40 5 7.5267 33% 
 
Table 4. 
Descriptive Statistics of The Board of Commissioner (BOC) Effectiveness 
 
Category 
Number of 
Questions Mean Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
The 
independency of 
the BOC 6 10.5986 17 7 2.1637 
The activity of 
BOC  6 14.2887 18 6 2.2865 
Number of BOC 1 2 3 1 0.9766 
The Competence 
of BOC  4 8.9155 12 5 1.4562 
Total Score 17 35.6479 45 21 4.2346 
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Table 5. 
Descriptive Statistics of The Board of Directors (BOD) Effectiveness 
 
Category 
Number of 
Questions Mean Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
The  Activities of 
BOD  5 12.3169 15 7 2.3531 
Number of BOD 1 2.0986 3 1 0.9987 
The Competence 
of BOD  2 4.8591 6 2 0.88 
Total Score 8 19.2746 24 12 3.0647 
 
The average value of the effectiveness of the BOD is 19.27 which indicates the 
effectiveness is on the level of between fair to good. This assessment is obtained by 
dividing the total value of 19.27 with eight questions which results in the value of 
2.40. 
 
Table 6. 
Descriptive Statistics of The Audit Committee Effectiveness 
 
Category 
Number of 
Questions Mean Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation 
Activities of the 
Audit Committee 8 16.9296 23 8 3.5683 
Number of Audit 
Committee 1 2.0775 3 1 0.3384 
Competence of 
the Audit 
Committee 2 3.9577 6 2 1.3625 
Total Score 11 22.9648 30 12 3.999 
 
Table 6 shows that the average effectiveness of the audit committee is 2.09 
obtained by dividing 22.97 with 11 questions. The value of 2.09 indicates that the 
average of companies surveyed already has an audit committee that is effective (fair). 
The big difference between the maximum and minimum value shows that there are 
companies that have an effective audit committee effective (good), but there are also 
companies that have an audit committee that is less effective (poor). 
According to table 7, the independent variables of BSUPS have a positive and 
significant effect on the dependent variable of MDISC (significance of 0.095), so 
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hypothesis H1a is accepted. This indicates that the effectiveness of the Board of 
Commissioners positively influences the level of mandatory disclosure in annual 
reports. This can be confirmed since one of the Board of Commissioners task is to 
supervise the and assess make the Board of Directors who creates the annual report. 
Moreover, one of the components in the annual report is an approval report and 
signature of the Board of Commissioners to show and assure that the annual report is 
accountable and has been disclosed according to the regulations. This is also 
consistent with the research by Gao & Kling (2012) that the effectiveness of the Board 
of Commissioners which is proxied by the board size in China also produce a positive 
and significant impact. 
 
Table 7. 
Regression Result of Research Model 1 
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient Significance 
BSUPS + 0.1553 0.095 *** 
BDIRSC + 0.2744 0.0000 * 
ACOMM + 0.0255 0.355 
AFEE + 0.0115 0.257 
AFIRM + -0.0253 0.045 ** 
AOPIN + -0.0053 0.4735 
SIZE + 0.0192 0.0015* 
LEV - -0.007 0.4725 
EVEBIT - -0.001 0.1185 
ROA + 0.2656 0.007 * 
Cons   -0.2133 0.092 
 
The independent variable of BDIRSC has a positive and significant effect on the 
dependent variable MDISC (significance 0.0000), so the hypothesis H2a is accepted. 
This indicates that the effectiveness of the Board of Directors positively influences the 
level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports. This also confirms that the Board of 
Directors is responsible for making the annual report and responsible for its contents. 
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Effective directors will also pay attention to the importance of the information 
completeness to be useful for users of the annual report. Moreover, they will also 
consider the level of regulation conformity regarding corporate governance, including 
the disclosure of the annual report. 
The independent variable AFIRM has a significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable MDISC (significance 0.045), so the hypothesis H5a is rejected. 
This is in line with the research conducted by Asthana et al. (2009) and Sun et al. 
(2012) which states that the Big Four auditor does not always ensure better disclosure. 
This significant negative influence can be associated with the limited time of the audit 
engagement. Thus auditors focus only on the information that has been compiled by 
the client. This condition does not encourage a better level of disclosure. The Big Four 
accounting firm may also have a more concise audit method than non-Big Four 
accounting firm, in which they focus more on the accordance of disclosure with the 
regulation. On the other hand, it also can be inferred that Indonesia's non-Big Four 
accounting firm has been able to encourage clients to make better disclosure following 
the regulation. Moreover, it can also be a tradeoff when a company decides to engage 
non-Big Four auditors, so the company tends to improve their disclosure. 
From the four control variables used, SIZE and ROA have a positive and 
significant effect on the MDISC (significance of 0.0015 and 0.007). This is in line 
with research conducted by Gao & Kling (2012) which states that companies with 
greater size tend to have a greater level of disclosure in its annual report. Meanwhile, 
profitability that has a  positive and significant impact on the level of mandatory 
disclosure in the annual report can be an incentive signaling. This infers that 
companies with high profitability will likely to better disclose information to the user 
with the intention of providing information that the company is profitable (Sun et al., 
2012 ). 
Based on Table 8, the independent variable BDIRSC positively influence VDISC 
(significance 0.002), so hypothesis H2b is accepted. It can be inferred that the 
voluntary disclosure of the company is initiated by the management initiatives as 
expressed by Healy & Palepu (2001). This initiative can occur in line with the 
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company's intention to provide information that adds value to the user's. Effective 
directors would see this as an effort that needs to be done because it will bring a 
positive impact for the company so that an effective Board of Directors will give a 
positive and significant impact on the level of mandatory disclosure in annual reports. 
 
Table 8. 
Regression Result of Research Model 2 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient Significance 
BSUPS + -0.1553 0.1385 
BDIRSC + 0.2422 0.002 * 
ACOMM + 0.2315 0.0035 * 
AFEE + -0.0038 0.4295 
AFIRM + 0.0218 0.129 
AOPIN + 0.0097 0.4395 
SIZE + 0.0257 0.0085 * 
LEV - -0.0104 0.185 
EVEBIT - 0 0.137 
ROA + 0.1824 0.109 
Cons   -0.6453 0.0005 
 
 
The independent variable ACOMM has a positive and significant effect at the 1% 
level on the dependent variable VDISC (0.0035 significance). Thus, hypothesis H3b is 
accepted. Dechow et al. (1996) and McMullen (1996) found a positive effect of the 
Audit Committee effectiveness on the financial statements. This study is also 
consistent with Li, Mangena, and Pike (2012) who found a significant positive 
correlation between the audit committee and voluntary disclosure of intellectual 
capital. Another study emphasizes the influence of the Audit Committee effectiveness 
on the disclosure on corporate social responsibility and internal controls which are not 
included in the voluntary disclosure points used as a checklist in this study. Moreover, 
both of these points are included in the mandatory disclosure of the annual report 
based on regulations set by Bapepam-LK in 2012. Nonetheless, the Audit Committee 
can assist the BOC to supervise at several aspects including voluntary disclosures such 
as risk, business marketing and internal controls that leads to an efficiency of 
operation.  
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 18 , No.2 , 2015 
186 
 
 
5. Conclusions, Implication, and Limitation 
This study aims to see the impact of the board of commissioners', the board of 
directors', audit committee's and external audit's effectiveness to the level of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure of the annual report. Based on the research, 
analysis, and discussion, it can be concluded as follows: 
1. The average level of mandatory disclosure of public companies in Indonesia is 
79%, measured by 161 disclosure items required which indicates a fairly good 
level of disclosure. Meanwhile, the level of voluntary disclosure of public 
companies in Indonesia is still low with an average disclosure of 33% 
measured by 59 voluntary disclosure items. 
2. The average public company in Indonesia has 0.71 scores of commissioners' 
effectiveness which are categorized as good to fair. The board of directors’ 
effectiveness of public companies in Indonesia has a value of 0.80 which is in 
the good category, and the average value of audit committee effectiveness is 
0.73 which is categorized as good to a fair category. 
3. This research proves that the effectiveness of the board of commissioners and 
directors has a significant positive effect on the level of mandatory disclosure 
in annual reports. It is argued that the duties and responsibilities of directors 
are compiling and disclosing information through annual reports. Board of 
commissioners is assigned to oversee the directors in the preparation of the 
annual report and also responsible for the annual report. The effectiveness of 
directors with the supervisory of the board of commissioners would enhance 
the mandatory disclosure of the annual report. The effectiveness of audit 
committees does not affect the level of mandatory disclosure of annual 
reports, as well as audit fees and audit opinion. The accounting firm size 
which conducts the audit process has a significant negative effect on the level 
of mandatory disclosure in annual reports. These study results prove that the 
audit cost gives insignificant influence on the level of both annual reports 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
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4. The results of this study prove that the board of commissioners and external 
audit effectiveness does not affect the level of annual report voluntary 
disclosure. The board of directors and audit committee effectiveness has a 
significant positive effect on the level of annual report voluntary disclosure. 
This occurs because the audit committee supervises more towards the 
voluntary information that should be disclosed. Meanwhile,  the board of 
commissioners supervises the board of directors in determining the voluntary 
information that should be disclosed.  
5. There are several limitations to the study: 
a. The sample of this research only uses one-year observation, so there is 
only a small sample of companies in this research. Also, the results can 
not be generalized to all industries because the companies in the financial 
industry were excluded. Future research is expected to examine the level 
of disclosure of companies in the financial industry. 
b. This research did not divide 142 sample data into the different industry so 
that the sample can not compare the level of disclosure by industry. Future 
research is expected to research with the consideration of the inter-
industry disclosure comparison. 
c. This study used the questionnaire developed by Herman (2009) to assess 
the effectiveness of the Board of Commissioners and the Audit 
Committee. The questionnaire contains an assessment guide based on 
certain criteria which adopted the checklist developed by IICD. 
Nevertheless, the assessment process is sometimes subjective. In the 
future, hopefully, there will be an objective and consistent measurement. 
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